







Self, Agency and Autonomy in Dynamical Living Systems
Abstract
In this paper, I intend to offer a new explanation of the self both from the biological and 
dynamical systems theory perspectives. This means that I support the idea that the self is a 
consequence of biological control mechanisms, either of the internal processes or resulting 
from  the  interaction  of  an  organism  with  the  environment.  From  the  perspective  of  the  
dynamical systems theory, the self will be approached as a bundle of patterns resulting from 
adapting of a living system to the conditions of the environment. In the first part of the paper, 
the  self  is  understood  starting  from  three  characteristics  of  the  living  systems,  resulting  
from the self-organisation of  the  organic  matter:  identity,  unity  and self-maintenance.  In  
the  second  part,  I  discuss  one  of  the  most  important  characteristics  of  the  self:  agency.  
The  sense  of  agency  is  approached as  being made of  three  components:  coupling of  the  
organism with the world, the control of the internal and external processes, and prediction. 
In conclusion, I discuss the issue of the relation between the self and autonomy, considering 




In	the	history	of	philosophy,	the	idea	of	self has been one of the most chal-
lenging	issues,	which	in	recent	years	has	been	approached	from	the	perspec-
























certainty	and	the	cognitive	core	of	man’s	mental	life.1  Against this concep-











its emergence and function.
Approaching	the	self,	understood	to	be	a	part	of	any	biological	creature,	opens	
the possibility of understanding it from the perspective of the dynamical sys-
tem theory. This new perspective results from the fact that living organisms 
are	considered	to	be	dynamical	systems,	those	systems	that	have	a	dynamic	
relationship with the environment they live in. This means that understanding 
living systems should also include explaining how their state space3 emerges 
and the patterns of action based on which they act in the world.
Thus,	starting	from	the	recent	approaches	of	the	self,	in	this	paper,	I	intend	
to offer a new explanation of the self both from the biological and dynami-
cal systems theory perspectives. This new approach of the self uses several 
already	existing	 theories,	which	would	be	useful	 to	recapitulate	 in	order	 to	
understand	my	way	of	approaching	the	self.	Firstly,	the	idea	of	the	self	I	pro-
pose	is	closer	to	David	Hume’s	conception	(2009	[1739]),	which	contests	the	
existence of the self as an indivisible entity that would guide our entire mental 
life.	To	Hume,	the	self	should	be	approached	as	a	bundle	of	impressions	and	
ideas	 that	 are	 interlinking	by	 resemblance	or	 causality	 relations.	Similarly,	
but	from	a	different	perspective,	Varela	speaks	of	a	selfless self,	“a	coherent	




that  it  is  a bundle of patterns resulting from the interaction of the adapting 
mechanisms	with	which	a	living	being	is	endowed,	is	supported	in	this	article,	
but from the perspective of the dynamical system theory.
The idea of approaching the self in terms of a theory of patterns has recently 
been	discussed	 by	Gallagher	 (2013).	According	 to	 him,	 the	 self	 should	 be	
seen	as	a	pattern	resulting	from	the	dynamic	interaction	of	certain	features,	
such	as:	minimal	embodied	aspects,	minimal	experiential	aspects,	affective	













aptative patterns of the organism.
Another idea that has generated recent debates in the current literature is that 
the self is a consequence of the interaction of some mechanisms at various 
levels	in	the	organism	(Thagard	2014).	According	to	this	conception,	the	self	
is  a  multi-level  system  that  results  from  the  integration  in  a  whole  of  the  









ous	system,	which	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	sensorimotor	control	of	 the	 living	
system,	thus	integrating	the	organism	in	the	environment	using	perception-ac-
tion	 loop,	 or	 consciousness,	which	provides	 higher-order	 cognitive	 control	
to the living systems. The sense of the self emerges from the integration of 
all	such	control	mechanisms	in	a	coherent	pattern	of	action,	which	provides	
identity and unity to the living organism.4
Consequently,	the	theory	of	the	self	I	present	in	this	article	combines	the	bi-
ological perspective with the dynamical systems theory. From the biological 
perspective,	I	try	to	explain	the	emergence	of	the	self	beginning	from	its	or-
ganic origins. This means that I support the idea that the self is a consequence 
of	biological	control	mechanisms,	either	of	the	internal	processes	or	resulting	
from the interaction of an organism with the environment. From the perspec-
tive	of	the	dynamical	systems	theory,	the	self	will	be	approached	as	a	bundle	
of	patterns	resulting	from	the	living	system’s	adaptation	to	the	environment’s	
conditions.  These  patterns  result  from  the  convergence  of  internal  dynam-
ics	of	the	organism	with	the	external	one,	whose	consequence	is	the	adjust-
ment of the organism behaviour to the changes in the external environment. 
Considering	 that	 the	 two	 perspectives	 are	 interconnected,	 I	 intend	 to	 offer	
a comprehensive approach to understanding the self as a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon.
1   
Even	if	modern	philosophers	agreed	with	the	
mental	 nature	of	 the	 self,	 they	 contested	 the	
idea	 that	 it	 has	 a	 substantial	 reality.	 Locke	
(1979	[1690]),	for	example,	considers	the	self	
as	a	consequence	of	consciousness,	which	al-
ways	 accompanies	 thinking.	 To	 Kant	 (1965	
[1781]),	 the	 self	 is	 approached	 as	 a	 condi-
tion	of	possibility	of	the	unity	of	experience,	
meaning  as  a  thought  that  accompanies  any  
act of knowing.
2   
However,	these	views	are	not	compatible.	Ac-
cording	 to	Zahavi	 (2007),	 the	 self	 is	not	 the	
fictional	 center	 of	 narrative	 gravity,	 but	 we	
can speak about various dimensions or levels 
of selfhood that can be approached differently 
 
from	 the	 narrative	 perspective.	 Thus,	 from	
the	 phenomenological	 perspective,	 what	 we	
call	(minimal	or	core)	self	is	the	first	person-
al	 giveness	 of	 the	 experiential	 phenomena,	
namely	what	gives	the	subjective	character	of	
experience	(Zahavi	2007,	p.	184).
3   
According	 to	 the	 dynamical	 system	 theory,	
state space represents the totality of the states 
that a system can occupy during its evolution.
4   
This	 means	 that,	 without	 a	 self,	 organisms	
could	 not	 coordinate	 and	 join	 in	 a	 coherent	
whole  the  adaptative  patterns  of  the  control  





from the perspective of  self-organisation as a process supporting the emer-
gence and maintenance of the living world. The self will be understood start-
ing	from	three	characteristics	of	the	living	systems,	resulting	from	the	self-or-
ganisation	of	the	organic	matter:	identity,	unity	and	self-maintenance.	In	the	
second	part,	 I	discuss	one	of	 the	most	 important	characteristics	of	 the	self:	
agency. This means that the organisms endowed with the self are not passive 
parts	of	 the	world,	but	 they	are	systems	 that	can	act	on	 it	and	 transform	it	







agency. These three types of agency are approached both from the perspective 
of  biological  mechanisms  wherefrom  their  functionality  originates  and  the  
dynamical	systems	theory.	In	conclusion,	I	discuss	the	relation	between	the	
self	and	autonomy,	considering	the	self	as	a	consequence	of	the	degrees	of	
freedom of a living system. 
1. Constitution of the Self in Living Systems
Self-organisation	is	 the	capacity	of	 living	matter	 to	configure,	 in	 time,	bio-
logical	systems,	to	self-sustain	and	self-replicate	under	the	circumstances	of	
environmental pressures. This means that self-organisation is the process of 
creating	 certain	 systems	with	 various	 degrees	 of	 autonomy,	 depending	 on	
their biological complexity. The creation of some autonomous biological sys-




contributes to the autonomy of the living system by coordinating the adapta-
tive patterns in increasingly complex action patterns. 
Recent	researches	of	the	relation	between	self-organisation	and	the	self,	de-
bating whether the self is merely the result of self-organisation of living mat-
ter or it is an important part of this process. An answer to this issue is given 
by	Maturana	and	Varela	(1980),	who,	from	the	perspective	of	the	autopoiesis	
process,5 consider that there should be a self that guides the self-production 















To	conclude,	 the	 self	 is	 a	 consequence	of	 self-organisation	but	 contributes	
to	maintaining	the	self-organisation	process	and	the	organism’s	viability.	In	




cause one of the functions of the self is to self-produce the internal processes 





the emergence of the self in the living system. It results from here that it is 
important to show how these three basic features of a self-organised system 
contribute to the emergence of the self of a living system.
a) Identity
Identity is a characteristic of a living system resulting from maintaining its in-
ternal	organisation	constant	(Maturana	&	Varela	1980)	and	its	internal	param-
eters	despite	the	perturbations	of	the	environment.	In	this	interpretation,	one	
does not talk of a self-identity or a personal identity. We can discuss this type 








coherence of internal interlinking processes whose goal is their own produc-
tion	 (Varela	1997,	 p.	 73).	 Identity,	 in	 this	 sense,	 is	 an	operational	 identity,	





An important role in this process is played by what the organisational view 
calls	second-order	constraints,	whose	role	is	to	regulate	the	organism	(More-
no	&	Mossio	2015).	According	 to	 this	 theory,	 second-order	 constraints	 in-
tervene	when	the	stability	of	the	system	is	endangered,	introducing	an	order	
5   
According	 to	 Maturana	 and	 Varela	 (1980,	
p.	 78),	 living	 organisms	 are	 autopoietic	ma-
chines,	which	means	 that	 they	are	character-
ized  by  the  fact  that  the  network  of  internal  
processes  contributes  to  maintaining  and  re-
generating  the  internal  components  and  pro-
cesses without having an external aim.
6	   
Operational	 closure	 (Maturana	 &	 Varela	
1980)	 is	 a	 consequence	of	 the	 recursivity	of	 
 
the internal processes of the biological organ-
ism,	which	determines	unitary	system.	Oper-
ational closure does not mean that the system 
is	closed,	 that	 it	does	not	communicate	with	
the	exterior.	On	the	contrary,	it	has	numerous	
interactions  with  the  environment  but  its  re-





pattern	 that	would	 restore	 the	 order	 in	 the	 organism.	 In	 other	words,	 sec-
ond-order	constraints	act	top-down	on	the	organisational	closure,	maintaining	






tional identity that results from the functional constraints of the system which 
determines recursive action patterns at its level.
Approaching the homeostatic character of organisms from the organisation-
al view can be completed with the perspective of dynamical systems. From 
this	point	of	view,	any	 living	system’s	goal	 is	 to	 lower	 internal	entropy	by	
minimising their  free energy and maintenance of  the organism in a  limited 
number	of	states	(Friston	2010).	This	means	that	the	living	systems,	as	dy-
namical	systems,	 tend	 to	maintain	constant	 their	 internal	states	by	creating	
some	order	patterns.	These	patterns	 tend	 towards	 the	organism’s	behaviour	
(i.e.	attractors);	they	are	not	randomly	created	but	configured	according	to	the	
organism’s	adapting	needs.	In	other	words,	attractors	are	patterns	that	reunite	
several	 system	variables,	 thus	 providing	 a	 response	 of	 the	 entire	 organism	
to the variations of environment. A living system is characterised by several 
such	patterns	of	action,	which	have	as	their	goal	the	survival	of	the	organism	
despite the perturbations of the environment.
In	Juarrero’s	terms,	this	means	that	“as	a	dynamic	system,	[...]	an	autopoietic	














ential	processes,7 an internal space whereby the organism sets its own limits 
from	the	surrounding	world.	In	the	autopoietic	tradition,	this	means	that	unity	
is	the	result	of	what	also	makes	the	identity	of	a	living	organism	–	operational	
closure	(Varela	1997).8 Unity and identity are thus a consequence of the co-
herence	of	the	network	of	processes	that	make	the	system:	“the	autopoietic	
mechanism will maintain itself as a distinct unity as long as its basic concat-
enation	of	processes	is	kept	intact	in	face	of	perturbations”	(Varela	1997,	p.	
76).	From	this	perspective,	the	recursive	character	of	the	internal	processes	is	





From	 the	point	of	view	of	 the	constitutive	processes,	unity	 is	 also	a	 result	
of	the	organism’s	internal	constraints.	According	to	the	organisational	view	
(Moreno	&	Mossio	2015),	owing	to	organisational	closure,	biological	organ-
isms	 can	 self-constraint,	 namely,	 to	modulate	 the	 ongoing	 thermodynamic	
flow	 they	are	exposed	to.	Thus,	internal	constraints	create	a	mutual	depend-
ence between the components of the system determining its action as a whole 
considering external perturbations.
Unity  is  also  a  consequence  of  the  homeostatic  tendency  of  the  system  to  
maintain its internal parameters constant. Any living system is characterised 
by	resistance	to	variance	(Rudrauf	&	Damasio	2006,	p.	438),	which	refers	to	
the capacity of any organism to maintain its internal equilibrium to deal with 
the ongoing perturbations. This process involves a response of the organism as 
a	whole,	which	involves	the	preservation	of	its	operational	unity	and	identity.
Another way operational closure contributes to constituting the unity of the 
system is by building a boundary of the system. The boundary of the system 
is	 seen	as	 a	 result	of	 the	 internal	 components	of	 the	organism,	whose	 role	
is  to  maintain  the  coherence  of  its  internal  processes  as  well  as  to  provide  







taking into account the changes of the world where it lives.
From	the	perspective	of	the	dynamical	systems,	the	role	of	the	boundary	is	to	
constitute a state space of the systems. Facilitating the energetic and chemical 
exchanges with the exterior constitutes the states of the organism that may be 








provide to the changes in the environment.
c) Self-Maintenance
Self-maintenance is the capacity of an organism to maintain its identity and 
unity	despite	the	perturbations	of	the	environment,	without	any	exterior	sup-
7   
Self-referential processes are those processes 
that	 contribute,	 according	 to	 the	 autopoietic	
approach,	only	to	producing	and	maintaining	
the	network	of	constitutive	processes,	without	
aiming at creating something external.
8  
In	this	approach,	unity	means	that	the	organ-
ism  is  a  distinct  entity  in  the  environment   
 
where	 it	 lives,	 responding	 as	 a	whole	 to	 the	
challenges	from	the	environment.	And,	iden-
tity represents the characteristic of the organ-
ism to maintain its internal organisation con-







as	 self-determination	 (Mossio	&	Bich	2014)	or	 in	 the	organisational	 view,	
it	 is	 called	 self-maintenance	 (Mossio	&	Moreno	 2010;	Moreno	&	Mossio	
2015).	A	 common	 characteristic	 of	 self-maintenance,	 in	 these	 approaches,	
is  the  fact  that  the  system can act  on its  boundary conditions  (Barandiaran 
&	Moreno	2008,	p.	332)	or	 the	 existing	conditions	 (Mossio	&	Bich	2014,	
p.	1090).	In	other	words,	self-maintenance	involves	self-referentiality	of	the	
internal	processes	of	the	organism,	which	is	at	the	origin	of	its	identity	and	




and the internal processes to maintain the continuity of the existence of the or-






here that the organisation of a living system is the consequence of the dynam-
ics	of	the	parts’	cohesion	and	the	internal	processes,	which	create	a	whole	that	
acts by constraints even on the parts that create it. In terms of the organisation 
view,	this	means	that	at	the	level	of	the	system,	a	new	causal	regime	emerges,	
which determines a closure of constraints that regulate the entire functionality 
of	the	organism	(Mossio	&	Bich	2014;	Moreno	&	Mossio	2015).
In	 conclusion,	 self-maintenance	 is	 a	 consequence	 of	 operational	 closure,	
which involves the realisation of a relation of dependence between the parts 
of	 the	organism	by	 the	constraints	 that	 such	organism,	as	a	whole,	exerted	
on	 its	 components.	From	 the	point	of	view	of	 the	dynamical	 systems,	 this	
means	 that	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 system,	 its	 constitutive	 processes	 determine	
a	 circular	 relation	between	parts	 and	whole,	whereby	 the	 system	 regulates	
its  internal  processes  and  the  exchanges  with  the  external  environment.  In  
Juarrero’s	terms	(1999),	this	means	that	the	organisation	of	the	system	is	the	
result	of	 the	dynamics	between	 the	bottom-up	constraints,	 the	 result	of	 the	
aggregation	of	the	system’s	components	and	the	top-down	constraints,	which	
determine	 the	possibility	of	new	states	 to	emerge,	 in	 the	state	space	of	 the	


















–	also	contributes.	 In	 this	context,	an	 important	 role	 is	played	by	what	 the	
autopoietic	 tradition	called	organisational	closure.	Owing	to	 the	self-gener-
ating	character	of	the	basic	processes,	the	organism	gains	identity,	unity,	and	










which is based on the processes whereby the organism aims at surviving un-
der the pressures of the environment. The basic self is a feature of any living 
system	that	needs	to	adapt	to	the	conditions	of	the	environment	where	it	lives,	
by regulating and controlling its internal variables.
2. Self and Agency
One	of	the	important	characteristics	of	living	beings	is	that	they	are	not	pas-
sive	parts	of	the	world	we	live	in,	but	they	have	a	propensity	to	action.	This	
means that any organism is an agent that responds to the changes in the envi-
ronment and act on the environment to modify it according to its own goals. 
Primitive forms of agency can also be met in unicellular organisms that in-
volve	only	the	basic	motility	of	the	living	system	(Deacon	2011).	Moreover,	
highly-organised	organisms	exhibit	advanced	forms	of	agency,	which	do	not	
consist in the mere moving away from potential threats or toward food sourc-
es.	In	advanced	forms,	agency	involves	the	discovery	of	new	action	possibili-
ties in the external world and even the development of long-term plans so that 












interaction	with	 the	 environment,	 the	 exertion	of	 constrains	 irrespective	of	
the	amount	of	energy	invested	by	the	agent,	organism’s	behaviour	according	
to	certain	norm	or	goal,	and	the	exertion	of	constraints	on	its	boundary	con-
9   
An example of  such dynamics is  the case of  
Benard	 cells	 (Juarrero	 1999,	 p.	 141).	 After	
self-organizing	 by	 heating	 below,	 in	 hexag-
onal,	 rolling	 cells,	 water	 molecules	 become	 
 
dependent on one another. Thus the behaviour 
of each molecule is guided by the behaviour 






can regulate their behaviour to be able to face the perturbations in the environ-
ment	(Moreno	&	Mossio	2015,	p.	99).	Such	an	approach	is	conducted	from	
the	perspective	of	the	organisation	of	a	living	system,	which	means	that	au-
tonomous agents are understood as having the capacity to regulate the bound-
ary conditions as a consequence of their internal dynamics.
Notwithstanding,	an	approach	of	 the	agency	of	biological	organism	should	
also take into account the dynamics which the organism has with the internal 












exchange with the environment are important processes for the survival of the 






















sists	 both	 in	 an	 internal	 constitutive	 dimension,	 implying	 the	 preservation	
of	 organisational	 closure,	 and	 in	 an	 external	 interactive	 dimension,	 imply-













result of the internal organisation of organism. The constraints resulting from 
the	interactive	processes	model	the	inner	space	of	the	organism,	according	to	
the	environmental	conditions,	which	results	 in	the	emergence	of	some	new	
responses of the organism as a whole to external changes.
These	 responses,	which	 imply	 the	 regulation	 of	 structural	 coupling,	 repre-
sent	the	adaptive	processes,	which	give	rise	to	adaptive	agency	(Barandiaran	
&	Moreno	 2008;	 Froese	&	Di	 Paolo	 2011).	 From	 this	 perspective,	 agents	
are considered as being able not only of compensatory responses but also of 
complex	behaviour	 (Barandiaran	&	Moreno	2008,	p.	332).	 In	other	words,	
constitutive	coupling	with	 the	world	affords	organisms,	depending	on	 their	
biological	complexity,	 to	 respond	 to	changes	and	detect	possibilities	 to	act	
in	 the	world.	 In	 other	 terms,	 autonomous	 cognitive	 systems	 act	 as	 agents,	
maintaining	 and	 regulating	 the	 ongoing	 sensorimotor	 loops,	whereby	 they	
maintain	the	connection	with	the	world	(Di	Paolo	&	Iizuka	2008,	p.	411).	It	
results from here that the connection between the organism and the world can 
be approached at several levels that depend on the capacities of the organism 
to	adjust	to	and	act	in	the	environment.
From	the	point	of	view	of	the	dynamical	systems,	the	structural	coupling	of	




ronment	 (Beer	 1995,	 p.	 173).	 From	 this	 perspective,	 living	 organisms	 and	






gence of the two systems involved.
This is possible due to the relation of circularity existing between the living 
system	and	the	world,	whereby	certain	parameters	of	one	of	the	systems	can	
turn	into	the	other’s	state	variable	(Beer	1995,	p.	181).	The	relation	of	circu-
larity10 refers to the fact that organisms acting on the world receive a response 
from	the	exterior,	which	becomes	a	variable	for	the	new	action.	In	this	way,	
living	systems	adjust	their	internal	dynamics,	resulting	from	the	self-organ-










This state space contains those possibilities of response that enable the organ-
ism’s	adaptation	to	the	environment,	determining	the	configuration	of	certain	
organisms’	trajectories	(Beer	1995,	p.	184).	In	this	state	space,	the	organism’s	
behaviour	 as	 a	whole	 is	determined,	 selecting	 those	patterns	of	 action	 that	
facilitate	the	organism’s	adaptation	to	the	environment.	For	this,	there	is	no	







that	organism,	by	 its	 adaptive	mechanisms,	 acts	on	 the	world,	 ensuring	 its	
survival. This means that the self is connected constitutively with the world as 




vergence of the organism patterns of action. 
b) Control of Internal Processes and Exchanges with the Exterior
Even	if	the	agency	of	living	systems	does	not	imply	a	control	centre	for	all	
the	actions	of	organisms,	there	should	still	be	a	way	to	coordinate	them.	Co-
ordination,	as	an	 important	characteristic	of	 the	 self,	 implies	 the	order	and	
coherence	of	the	systems’	adaptive	patterns	so	that	the	organism	as	a	whole	
resists disturbances from the environment.
In	terms	of	organisational	view,	this	is	explained	by	the	constraints	generated	




emergence of biological organisms and their autonomy creates a network of 
constitutive	constraints	 that	mutually	condition.	As	we	have	seen,	 it	results	




isms to act on their own internal organisation by means of constraints so that 
they adapt to the conditions in the environment. Starting from the closure of 
internal	constraints,	it	also	results	in	the	interactive	dimension	of	the	agency	
by extending the causal powers of constraints on the boundary conditions of 
the	whole	system	(Moreno	&	Mossio	2015,	p.	XXXI).	Thus,	based	on	 the	
capacity	 to	act	on	 itself,	 the	capacity	of	 the	agent,	which	becomes	 thus	an	
autonomous	living	system,	to	act	on	the	environment,	is	created.
From	the	point	of	view	of	dynamical	system	theory,	the	constraints	existing	at	














of freedom that determine a new evolution of the system.
In	 terms	of	organisational	view,	 this	ability	 to	manipulate	 the	system’s	 tra-
jectory,	owing	 to	 the	constraints	 that	 emerged	 in	 the	 system,	 is	 considered	
a	form	of	adaptive	control	(Mossio	&	Moreno	2010,	p.	285).	Similarly,	also	
from	the	perspective	of	dynamical	system	theory,	the	ability	of	a	constraint	to	
alter the path of degrees of freedom of a variable of the system is considered 
a	form	of	control	as	well	(Pattee	1973,	p.	42).	These	convergent	opinions	in	
organisation theory and dynamical system theory come to highlight the idea 
that the agency does not imply a centred self that should control the system. 
However,	the	control	of	living	systems	is	carried	out	spontaneously	due	to	the	







organisation (Bich et al.	2015,	p.	8).	In	this	approach,	regulation	involves	a	
circular  organisation between constraints  that  contribute  to  maintaining the 
organism’s	 internal	organisation,	which,	 in	 turn,	contributes	 to	maintaining	
these constraints (Bich et al.	2015,	p.	9).
This means that the dynamics between the regulatory and constitutive con-





the perturbations in the environment and new possibilities to act in the world.
The regulation of the system parameters with a view to creating a coherent 








have as a consequence the convergence of internal processes dynamics with 





The degree of complexity of this self is given by the level of complexity of 









to maintain constant the internal variables and enable the organism to act in 
the	world.	The	 dynamical	 self	 results	 from	 the	 organism’s	 control	mecha-
nisms,	which	are	regulated	to	coordinate	the	organism’s	internal	and	exter-
nal dynamics. Thus the autonomy of a living system is not given merely by 
maintaining constant its internal organisation but also from the dynamics of 
the	organism’s	control	mechanisms,	which	represent	 the	basis	for	acting	in	
the world. 













requirement of anticipatory systems is that they contain an anticipatory model 
of positions they may occupy their states and variables in the environment. 
This  does  not  mean  that  anticipatory  systems  are  representational  systems  
that	act	 inferentially	to	adjust	 the	organism’s	behaviour	to	the	variations	in	






of	 state	 space,	of	a	vector	field,	 which	 is	activated	whenever	 the	organism	
detects a change internally or in the environment. This means that living or-
ganisms have the ability to constitute some behavioural patterns only based 
on  expectancies  regarding  internal  or  external  changes.  And  these  patterns  
emerged	whenever	the	system’s	variables	are	about	to	shift	their	values.
Detecting changes in the world does not require awareness of regularities in 
the	environment	but	only	adjusting	the	behaviour	according	to	the	values	of	
the external parameters by activating some pre-established patterns of action. 
This	means	that	when	external	parameters	reach	certain	values,	the	organism	
can	anticipate	the	shift	of	the	external	state,	and	then,	of	its	own	state,	merely	
based	 on	 the	 data	 from	 sensory	 organs.	 Similarly,	 internal	 changes	 can	 be	
anticipated based on the internal control mechanisms of the living system. In 
both	cases,	it	acts	based	on	patterns	of	action	built	based	on	prior	experiences	











of  a  higher  form  of  regulation  called  allostasis	 (Sterling	 2012;	 Schulkin	
2011).	According	to	the	supporters	of	this	theory,	one	of	the	most	important	
functions of the brain is to monitor as large a number of internal and external 




spective,	 anticipating	 internal	 and	 external	 changes	 becomes	 an	 important	
requirement	 of	 the	 organisms’	 adaptation	 and	 survival	 in	 the	 environment,	








so that some behavioural patterns emerge in agreement with the new param-
eters.	Thus,	 at	 the	 level	of	 the	organism,	an	extended	state	 space	emerges,	









external processes guides the actions towards a goal. Anticipation implies the 













3. Types of Agency in Dynamical Living Systems
As	autonomous	dynamical	systems,	organisms	have	a	self	owing	to	the	dy-
namics	of	their	internal	organisation,	and	they	are	agents	able	to	initiate	ac-
tions and to act  on the milieu so that  they survive considering the external  




wants to be an autonomous living system.
However,	 not	 all	 organisms	 have	 the	 same	 degree	 of	 complexity,	 which	







terises the organisms with higher-order cognitive skills.
These  forms  of  agency  are  discussed  according  to  the  three  coordinates  of  
any	 living	agent:	 the	way	organism	is	coupled	constitutively	 to	 the	milieu,	
the	control	of	internal	and	external	processes,	and	last	but	not	least,	how	the	
changes on the internal and external milieu are anticipated. These aspects are 
discussed  both  from  the  biological  perspective  and  the  dynamical  systems  
perspective so that a comprehensive explanation of the agency can be reached. 
a) Minimal Agency
One	can	speak	about	minimal	agency	in	the	case	of	simple	organisms,	which	




p.	94).	This	means	 that	 the	 regulation	of	minimal	agents	 is	only	a	 form	of	










that	 separates	 the	organism	 from	 the	world	 (i.e.,	membrane),	whereby	 liv-
ing	organisms	create	their	internal	space,	enabling	the	organism’s	basic	form	
of coupling with the world. This coupling implies only the detection of the 
changes	in	the	milieu	owing	to	the	organism’s	receptors.	To	these	changes,	
minimal agents will only respond with basic adaptive reactions (such as gen-
der,	adjusting	internal	processes	or	releasing	chemical	substances).	In	other	
words,	minimal	agency	characterises	organisms	with	several	adaptive	func-









es based on predicting the sequence of some events of thermic or chemical 
changes in the milieu.
From	the	point	of	view	of	dynamical	systems,	organisms	with	minimal	agen-
cy	 have	 a	 limited	 state	 space,	where	 only	 simple	 behavioural	 patterns	 can	






of the milieu so that the organism becomes part of the milieu.
In	 conclusion,	minimal	 agency	 is	 a	 characteristic	 of	 organisms	with	mini-
mal	self,	which	results	from	the	integration	in	a	whole	of	the	basic	adaptive	
functions	of	any	biological	system.	Given	the	basic	structures,	such	an	organ-
ism has a coupling with the world whereby it can only perceive the external 












to relate to the milieu. The nervous system is considered as a new subsystem 
of	the	organism.	It	represents	a	new	level,	detached	from	the	metabolic	one	
(Moreno	&	Etxeberria	2005).12 This means that the nervous system processes 
the	 energy	 resulting	 from	 the	organism’s	metabolic	 processes	 to	 constitute	
a dynamic level that would be free from the constraints of the biochemical 
level	(Barandiaran	&	Moreno	2008,	p.	336).	The	nervous	system	provides	the	




It results from here that the nervous system provides the possibility that the 
organism	perceives	the	world	in	terms	of	the	organism’s	action	abilities.	Cou-




















world and guided by external norms. This means that sensorimotor loops are 
guided	by	external	goals	(Di	Paolo	2005,	p.	439),	generating	patterns	of	ac-
tion	that	no	longer	pursue	the	regulation	of	their	constitutive	level.	Moreover,	
another consequence of the sensorimotor coupling with the world is the fact 









with	a	 type	of	higher	control,	which	no	 longer	 implies	merely	 to	maintain	
constant the internal variables of the organism by controlling the metabolic 




coming from the exterior. To the extent that the interaction with the milieu is 
an	epistemic	one,	meaning	 that	 it	 implies	gaining	some	information	by	 the	
organism,	 information	 that	would	 trigger	 its	 actions	 (Etxeberria,	Merelo	&	
Moreno	1994,	p.	53),	the	control	provided	by	the	nervous	system	becomes	an	
epistemic one. This means that we no longer speak of biochemical responses 
to	the	variation	of	the	milieu	but	of	the	embedding	of	the	organism’s	internal	
and external variables in a pattern of action that would increase the chances 
of the organism to achieve its goals.









mensional,	 and	 non-linear	 system,	which	 determines	 the	 emergence	 in	 the	










of freedom emerge. It allows the organism to achieve a goal in various ways. 
Thus,	the	nervous	system	enables	the	organism	different	ways	to	act	in	the	
world,	which	would	provide	extended	autonomy,	with	a	multi-dimensional	
state space and many degrees of freedom.
c) Cognitive Agency
It is a type of agency that we encounter in the case of organisms with higher-or-
der	cognitive	skills.	We	refer	here	to	multicellular	organisms,	with	a	complex	
cognitive	life,	characterised	by	higher	forms	of	awareness	and	self-conscious-
ness. Consciousness represents a new level of the organism that provides a 
top-down	possibility	of	self-organisation	according	to	some	other	dynamics,	
















nicable through language offers the possibility to interact directly with other 
persons	and	create	some	joint	actions.	In	addition,	the	others’	narratives	can	




The  emergence  of  the  informational  level  allows  for  a  different  control  of  
the	organism,	which	 implies	more	 than	 the	sensorimotor	 loop	with	 the	ex-
terior.	Consciousness	organises	the	life	of	the	living	systems,	incorporating	
automated responses in long-term action patterns that take into account the 
possible changes that occurred in the natural or social milieu. This means that 
organisms  with  consciousness  can  develop  complex  plans  that  would  take  
into account many variables in the development of action. The behaviour of 
such	organisms	is	thus	guided	not	only	by	short-term	intentions,	whereby	im-
mediate needs are met but also by long-term plans that aim at achieving future 
goals.	In	other	words,	cognitive	agency	implies	“the	ability	to	control	goal/
task-related,	deliberate	thought”	(Metzinger	2013),	whereby	the	organism’s	
behaviour is guided on a short and long term.
From	the	point	of	view	of	the	dynamical	systems	theory,	the	control	exerted	





all  the  variables  of  the  system.  This  means  that  the  metacognitive  level  of  




vides the organism with many action possibilities as they have many degrees 
of freedom.
Last	but	not	least,	organisms	with	higher-order	cognitive	skills	rely	on	their	





the brain builds patterns of action with several degrees of freedom that would 




ganisms	 are	 subjected	 to	 some	 permanent	 energetic	 and	 informational	 ex-
changes,	which	they	need	to	regulated	so	that	to	maintain	their	equilibrium	





organism but also its states potentially to be occupied depending on the vari-






means  that  it  has  an  extended  state  space  where  behavioural  patterns  with  
unpredictable	trajectories	and	multi-dimensional	degrees	of	freedom	emerge.	
Agency in any of its forms involves the autonomy of the organism. The pos-


































complexity	 of	 the	 organism’s	 patterns	 of	 action,	 the	 organism	 can	 provide	





are at the origin of the emergence of the self. The autonomy of a living system 
and	the	self	are	thus	related	phenomena,	resulting	from	the	degrees	of	free-
dom of the patterns of action that emerge in the living system.
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Teodor Negru
Sebstvo, svjesno djelovanje i 
autonomija	u	dinamičkim	živućim	sustavima
Sažetak
U ovom je radu moja namjera ponuditi novo objašnjenje sebstva iz teorijskih perspektiva 
biologije i dinamičkih sustava. To znači da podržavam ideju da je sebstvo posljedica bioloških 
kontrolnih mehanizama, bilo unutarnjih procesa ili kao ishod međudjelovanja organizma 
i okoliša. Iz perspektive teorije dinamičkih sistema, sebstvo se može razumjeti kao svežanj 
uzoraka proizlazećih iz prilagodbe živućeg sustava na uvjete okoliša. U prvom dijelu rada, 
sebstvo se razumijeva polazeći od tri obilježja živućih sustava koji su rezultat samoorganizacije 
organske materije: identitet, jedinstvo i samoodržavanje. U drugom dijelu, raspravljam o 
jednom od najvažnijih obilježja sebstva: svjesnom djelovanju. Značenju svjesnog djelovanja 
pristupa se kao da se sastoji od tri dijela: sprega organizma sa svijetom, upravljanje unutarnjim 
i vanjskim procesima te predviđanje. Zaključno, raspravljam o problemu veze između sebstva 





Autonomie in dynamischen lebenden Systemen
Zusammenfassung
Mit  diesem  Artikel  beabsichtige  ich,  eine  neuartige  Erklärung  des  Selbst  aus  theoretischen  
Perspektiven der Biologie und dynamischen Systeme vorzulegen. Dies bedeutet, dass ich 
die Idee bekräftige, das Selbst sei die Konsequenz biologischer Kontrollmechanismen, seien 
es interne Prozesse oder als Ausgang der Interaktion von Organismus und Umwelt. Aus der 
Perspektive der Theorie dynamischer Systeme kann das Selbst als ein Bündel von Mustern 
aufgefasst werden, welche der Anpassung eines lebenden Systems an die Umweltbedingungen 
entsprießen. Im ersten Teil der Arbeit wird das Selbst ausgehend von drei Merkmalen 
lebender Systeme erfasst,  die das Ergebnis der Selbstorganisation organischer Materie sind: 
Identität, Einheit und Selbsterhaltung. Im zweiten Teil bespreche ich eine der bedeutsamsten 
Eigenschaften des Selbst: Handlungsfähigkeit. Die Bedeutung der Handlungsfähigkeit wird in 
der Art angegangen, als bestünde sie aus drei Teilen: der Kopplung des Organismus an die Welt, 




das Problem der Verknüpfung zwischen Selbst und Autonomie, wobei ich das Selbst als Ausfluss 




Le soi, l’action consciente et 
l’autonomie dans les systèmes dynamiques vivants
Résumé
Dans ce travail, mon intention est de proposer une nouvelle explication du soi issue des théories 
en biologie et des systèmes dynamiques. Cela signifie que je soutiens l’idée selon laquelle 
le  soi  est  la  conséquence  des  mécanismes  de  contrôles  biologiques,  autant  des  processus  
internes,  qu’en  tant  que  résultat  de  l’interaction  entre  l’organisme  et  l’environnement.  
Selon la perspective de la théorie  des systèmes dynamiques,  le  soi  peut  être  compris  comme 
un  faisceau  de  causes  qui  découlent  de  l’adaptation  des  systèmes  vivants  aux  conditions  de  
l’environnement.  Dans  la  première  partie  de  ce  travail,  le  soi  est  considéré  sur  la  base  de  
trois  caractéristiques  des  systèmes  vivants  qui  sont  le  résultat  de  l’auto-organisation  de  la  
matière vivante : l’identité, l’unité et l’auto-conservation. Dans la deuxième partie, je discute 
de l’une des plus importantes caractéristiques du soi : l’action consciente. La signification de 
l’approche de l’action consciente est composée de trois parties : la relation de l’organisme avec 
le monde, l’organisation des processus internes et externes et la prévision. En conclusion, je 
discute du problème de la relation entre le soi et l’autonomie, en considérant le soi comme une 
conséquence du degré de liberté du système vivant.
Mots-clés
soi,	action	consciente,	autonomie,	système	dynamique,	autopoïèse
